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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory failure, often argued to be linked to the political influence of the financial industry 
(Acemoglu, 2009; Calomiris, 2009; Johnson, 2009), has been alleged to be one of the key 
contributors to the recent global financial crisis (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2010; Dagher and Fu, 
2011). More generally, political economy factors may interfere with the process through which 
specific financial regulations are designed and implemented (e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 1999; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010).  While political influence can be 
an important factor shaping regulatory frameworks in any industry,1 it is particularly interesting 
to study the financial sector because it is one of the most heavily-regulated and the largest source 
of politically-targeted spending in the United States (Center for Responsive Politics, 2009).  
 Arguments for the link between financial regulation and political influence of the 
financial industry mostly rely on anecdotal evidence.2 Studying this link in a formal framework, 
however, is often constrained by availability of detailed information on politically targeted 
                                                 
1 Political influence can also have an impact on economic and financial outcomes (e.g., Fisman, 2001, Cooper, 
Gulen and Ovtchinnikov, 2010). 
2 For instance, at the end of 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that Ameriquest Mortgage and Countrywide 
Financial, two of the largest mortgage lenders in the nation, spent millions of dollars in political donations, 
campaign contributions, and lobbying activities from 2002 through 2006 (Simpson, 2007).  The sought outcome, 
according to the article, was the defeat of anti-predatory lending legislation and fending off of similar laws.  The 
Financial Times recounted a similar story based on a Center for Public Integrity study linking subprime originators 
to lobbying efforts to prevent tighter regulation of the mortgage market (Luce, 2009).  In fact, banks continued to 
lobby intensively against tighter regulation and financial regulatory reform even as the industry struggled financially 
and suffered from negative publicity (Labaton, 2009).   
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activities.  The case of the United States provides an excellent opportunity to look into the issue 
in more detail for two reasons.  First, it was the epicenter of a systemic financial crisis.  Second, 
there is a wealth of publicly available information on political activities of the financial industry. 
 This paper studies the relationship between the political influence of the finance, 
insurance and real estate industry (FIRE) and financial regulation during 1999-2006 in the 
United States.  In particular, we ask the following questions.  Did politically targeted activities 
by FIRE have a link to the legislative outcomes of the bills on financial regulation?  Were 
legislators’ network connections with the financial industry and the lobbyists related to their 
decision to support certain proposals?   
 For our analysis, we construct a comprehensive dataset on the politically targeted 
activities of financial companies.  Specifically, we gather (i) firm-level data on the lobbying 
expenditures targeted toward specific bills and on campaign contributions targeted to particular 
legislators; (ii) information on employment histories of the legislators and the lobbyists hired to 
work on these specific bills, to pin down the network connections between the legislators 
(Capitol Hill) and lobbyists (K Street) as well as the financial industry (Wall Street)3; (iii) 
detailed information on 47 bills related to financial regulation, including their provisions so that 
they can be grouped into broad categories based on their similarities. 
 Our empirical strategy is to exploit the cases in which legislators “switch” positions on 
a given legislation proposal.  In other words, we use the variation in political spending by FIRE 
at the bill level and the variation in the position taken by the same legislator on the same issue in 
                                                 
3 Capitol Hill is where the U.S. Congress offices are located, K Street is where many lobbyists have offices in 
Washington, DC, and Wall Street is where many financial companies have offices in New York. 
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its different “reincarnations”.  Hence, the baseline specification looks at whether an individual 
legislator switches her support for a particular bill or not is linked to the lobbying expenditures 
by firms affected by the bill as revealed by their decision to lobby on that bill (‘affected firms’), 
and to the network connections she shares with the lobbyists and the financial industry.  The 
estimating equation controls for any unobserved time-varying legislator and bill characteristics.  
This strategy is similar to the one used in Stratmann (2002).  The main findings emerging from 
our analysis are as follows.   
 First, lobbying expenditures by affected financial firms were significantly associated 
with whether or not the legislators switched their vote on the key bills that preceded the crisis: 
more intense lobbying on a bill was linked to better odds that a legislator would switch her 
stance in favor of deregulation in a subsequent reincarnation of a bill.  This link is statistically 
and economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in spending on lobbying is 
associated with a 37 percentage-point increase in the probability of switching. 
 Second, network connections between legislators and lobbyists who worked on a 
specific bill have a significant positive association with switching from being against to being in 
support of deregulation: whether any of the lobbyists working on a bill also worked for a 
legislator in the past sways the stance on that bill in favor of deregulation.  Having a connected 
lobbyist working on a bill is associated with an increase in the probability of switching by 2.5 
percentage points.   
 Furthermore, network connections and certain legislator characteristics affect the 
strength of the relationship between lobbying and the probability of switching.  Spending an 
extra dollar matters twice as much in switching a legislator’s position if the lobbyist is connected 
to the legislator compared to the case where the lobbyist is unconnected.  Lobbying has a 
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stronger link to moving support towards deregulation if the legislator is more conservative and if 
the legislator worked in Wall Street.     
 Our paper contributes to an emerging body of work on the political economy of the 
recent financial crisis.  Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011) look at the association between lobbying 
activities and risk taking by financial institutions in the run-up to the crisis. They show that 
lobbying lenders tended to engage more in risky lending practices between 2000 and 2006 and 
suffered worse outcomes during the crisis.  This paper, in contrast, looks directly at the 
association of lobbying and campaign contributions to the outcomes of the legislative process 
governing financial regulation.  By documenting the direct link between politically targeted 
activities and legislative outcomes, this study complements Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011), 
where one of the stories that could explain the link between lobbying and risk taking is that 
lobbying by the financial industry played a role in making the regulatory environment lax, which 
allowed the lenders to engage in riskier lending. 
 A couple of other papers look at the legislative outcomes in the context of the recent 
crisis.  Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010a) focus on the congressional voting behavior on two key 
pieces of legislation that shaped the regulatory response after the crisis.  Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 
(2010b) analyze voting patterns on six bills prior to the crisis.  They find that constituent 
interests and special interests played a significant role in explaining voting patterns both prior to 
and after the crisis.   
 Our analysis adds to this growing literature in three important aspects.  First, we 
address a broader question: rather than limiting the analysis to only a small set of bills on the 
mortgage market alone, we look at a large set of financial regulation proposals in the run-up to 
the crisis with far-reaching consequences for risk-taking in the financial system.  Second, our 
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measure of politically targeted expenditures is a more precise measure of special interests.  
Instead of using the aggregate contributions by the financial industry, we utilize firm-level 
information in order to establish a direct link between firms more likely to be affected by these 
proposals (revealed by their active lobbying agenda on these bills) and the legislators’ position 
on these bills.  Third, we bring in a dimension not explored in other studies, namely, the network 
connections between the legislators, lobbyists, and the financial industry.   
 To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to provide evidence that voting on 
key bills on financial regulation was linked to the network connections between the financial 
industry, legislators, and lobbyists.  These network connections are commonly tagged as the 
“revolving door”.  Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) document the importance of these 
connections in determining which issues lobbyists work on. Similarly, in a recent study, Blanes-
Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2011) show that lobbyists who have worked for legislators in the 
past generate more revenue.  One possible explanation for this result is that connected lobbyists 
are more influential in securing the desired outcome for their clients than unconnected lobbyists 
are.  Our results support this explanation as we show that lobbying spending by the financial 
industry through connected lobbyists is more strongly associated with the switch in a legislator’s 
position toward deregulation. 
 Overall, our findings establish a robust link between voting patterns on financial 
regulation proposals and lobbying and network connections between legislators and the financial 
industry, either directly or through hiring of lobbyists.  This link can be interpreted to support the 
notion that the political influence of the financial industry played a role in shaping the regulatory 
landscape in the run-up to the crisis.  Going forward, financial regulation reforms currently under 
consideration may also be subject to such influence.  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief account of the 
legislative process in the United States, the role of lobbying in this process, and the key 
legislative landmarks regarding financial regulation prior to the crisis.  Section III describes the 
data and the methodology.  Section IV presents the results of the empirical analysis.  Section V 
concludes. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Legislative Process 
The federal law-making process in the U.S., from the initial idea for a legislative proposal 
through its publication as a statute, is a not a simple or short one.4  The process is initiated by the 
introduction of a proposal in the form of a bill or resolution (which can be a joint, concurrent, or 
simple resolution) by a member/s of the House of Representatives or the Senate (‘the sponsor’ 
and the ‘cosponsors’).  Each bill must have a sponsor and may have zero or more co-sponsors.  
At this point, the proposals are assigned a legislative number by the clerk of the Congressional 
Record.5  These bills and resolutions are then referred to committees that deliberate, investigate, 
and, if necessary, revise them before they are accepted for general debate.  Arguably, this is the 
                                                 
4 For a complete explanation, see Document 110-49 of the U.S. House of Representatives available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html.  
5 For instance, a bill introduced at the House of Representatives is designated by ‘‘H.R.’’ followed by a number that 
it retains throughout all its parliamentary stages while bills introduced at the Senate is designated by ‘‘S.’’ followed 
by its number. The term ‘‘companion bill’’ is used to describe a bill introduced in one House of Congress that is 
similar or identical to a bill introduced in the other House of Congress. The majority of proposals considered are 
introduced as bills rather than resolutions.  
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most important phase of the process because, for the majority of bills and resolutions, this marks 
the end of the road.6  Should the committee decide to recommend a bill or resolution for 
approval, it usually prepares a comprehensive report that describes the purpose and scope of the 
bill and the reasons for its recommended approval, generally along with a section-by-section 
analysis setting forth precisely what each section is intended to accomplish.  The original bill, if 
not ‘dead’ in a committee, often leaves the committee with several amendments.  Once a bill or 
resolution is recommended by the committee(s) to which it was referred, it comes to the chamber 
that originated the bill for consideration and debate.  At the end of the reading and discussion of 
the bill in its entirety, the originating chamber first votes on whatever amendments have been 
reported by the committee(s) and then immediately votes on the passage of the bill with the 
amendments it has adopted.7 If the bill passes, an engrossed copy, with all the amendments and 
in the exact same format that it was passed by the originating chamber, is sent to the other 
chamber of Congress.  At this point, the measure ceases technically being a bill and becomes an 
                                                 
6 Often legislation goes to subcommittees for consideration before moving to the full committee and sometimes it is 
the subcommittee that does all the work. Although it would be extremely interesting to study the committee 
decisions in addition to the other steps in the legislative process, we are not aware of any systematic record of these 
decisions.  
7 Note that the process followed on the chamber floor may differ since the Rules Committee may attach bill-specific 
rules that can limit debate, votes, amendments, etc. (see http://opencrs.com/document/98-853/2007-11-26/ and 
http://opencrs.com/document/98-426/2007-03-21/ for more details). Also, the voting at the originating chamber is 
the end of the process in some cases. In particular, simple and concurrent resolution are not functionally identical to 
bills in that they bounce to the other chamber and are passed by the President: simple resolutions are considered only 
by one chamber and concurrent resolutions are not sent to the President. 
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‘act’ (although the popular term remains as a ‘bill’).  The act goes through similar steps in the 
second chamber: referral to committee(s), debate, and vote.  The original engrossed bill, together 
with the engrossed amendments, if any, from the second chamber, is then returned to the 
originating chamber with a message stating the action taken by the second chamber.  If there are 
any differences between the two versions, a ‘conference’ may be called to resolve any 
disagreements or competing versions bounce between each chamber until the disputes on 
legislative text is resolved (the so-called ‘ping pong strategy’).  Once an agreement on an 
identical form of the act is reached, a copy is presented to the President.  A bill becomes law on 
the date of approval or passage over the President’s veto, unless it expressly provides a different 
effective date.  
The voting at either chamber may be done in one of three ways: the voice vote (where the 
chair asks first for all those in favor of the motion to indicate so verbally, and then ask second all 
those opposed to the motion to indicate so verbally), the division (where the members supporting 
and opposing the motion stand successively and are counted) and the recorded vote.  By 
definition, only the recorded vote allows one to determine at a later date which members voted 
for and against a motion.  As to be discussed later, this procedural factor limits the voting 
occasions we can formally analyze by forcing us to drop the bills for which a voice vote or 
unanimous consent were indicated as outcomes.  In order to provide a more complete picture of 
the role of legislation governing financial regulation on the way up to the financial crisis, we also 
utilize information on sponsorship and co-sponsorship of a bill. 
B.   Politically Targeted Activities  
Although lobbying is commonly recognized to be an influential political economy activity in 
many countries (Bertok, 2008), the U.S. is somewhat unique in the disclosure requirements 
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applicable to such activity.  Specifically, lobbyists - often organized in special interest groups - 
can legally influence the policy formation process through two main channels.  First, lobbyists 
are allowed to carry out lobbying activities in the executive and legislative branches of the 
government.  Second, they can offer campaign finance contributions, in particular, through 
political action committees (PACs).  In one respect, campaign contributions aim at putting or 
keeping the “right” candidates in office while lobbying expenditures seek to influence the 
opinion of those who are already holding the power to make the decisions. 
Companies and other special interest groups spend billions of dollars each year to lobby 
the Congress and federal agencies.  Some of these retain lobbying firms, many of them located 
along Washington's legendary K Street; others have lobbyists working in-house.  Under the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), subsequently modified by the Honest Leadership and 
Open Government Act of 2007, all lobbyists (acting as intermediaries between 
legislators/regulators and clients with the aim to voice their opinion on various issues) have to 
file semi-annual reports to the Secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR), 
provided that they satisfy the conditions specified in the LDA.  
“Lobbying activity” is defined in Section 3(7) of the LDA as “lobbying contacts or 
efforts in support of such contacts, including background work that is intended, at the time it was 
performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others”.  While 
the exact nature of lobbying activities is somewhat elusive, the official description of a lobbyist 
in the Congress guide to the LDA is “any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a 
client for financial or other compensation; (2) whose services include more than one lobbying 
contact; and (3) whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services 
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during a three-month period.”  Any person meeting these criteria must register as a lobbyist 
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. 
In addition to lobbying, politically targeted activities involve financing of campaigns for 
elected officials and candidates.  PACs, often representing business or ideological interest 
groups, are organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and, sometimes, 
defeat particular candidates.  The total amount PACs can contribute to an individual candidate’s 
committee is capped: it cannot exceed $5,000 per election (primary, general, or special).  
Similarly, they cannot give more than $15,000 annually to any national party committee and 
$5,000 annually to any other PAC.  On the receiving side, they may receive up to $5,000 from 
any one individual, PAC or party committee per calendar year.  These limits are applied on a 
consolidated basis to affiliated PACs by treating them all as one entity.8  
                                                 
8 The affiliations are based on the names of the connected organization PACs provide when they register with the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC).  We refer the interested reader to the FEC website (http://www.fec.gov/ ) for 
more information on PACs. Also, note that  the rules governing campaign contributions have changed significantly 
from what is described here in the wake of the 2010 Supreme Court decision commonly known as “Citizens 
United”, which granted corporations, unions, and individuals the right to donate unlimited finds to outside groups to 
campaign for or against candidates. One byproduct of the decision was the “Super PACs”, which do not have the 
same reporting requirements. Since these developments happened after the end of our sample period, the analysis is 
not affected by them.  
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C.   Road to the Crisis 
Many observers claimed that regulatory failure was one of the culprits that paved the road to the 
financial crisis of 2007-08.  In this section, we provide an overview of the key pieces of 
legislation that shaped the financial landscape prior to the crisis.9 
Since the 1980s, the U.S. financial regulatory system has been on a deregulatory process 
that, arguably, aimed to modernize the regulatory landscape and gained momentum in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. There were several crucial steps in this process, starting with the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act.  The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA) formally 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (also known as the Banking Act of 1933) and related 
laws, which prohibited commercial banks from offering investment banking and insurance 
services.  Once banks were allowed to engage in these services, activity in private-label 
securitization and derivatives markets stepped up.  Yet, supplementary regulation to control the 
risks associated with these new services somewhat lagged behind: rules established by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board allowed off-balance-sheet operations involving 
securitized loans, eliminating the need to hold capital reserves against such liabilities.  The 
following year, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) further enhanced 
the ability of commercial banks and other financial institutions by exempting financial 
derivatives, including credit default swaps, from regulation. 
In parallel to legislation allowing commercial banks to expand their financial activities 
and get more interconnected with the rest of the financial system, there have been a couple of 
                                                 
9 A full list of legislative proposals that got FIRE attention (indicated by being mentioned under specific issues in 
the lobbying reports) and their overview is in the Supplemental Appendix. 
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important changes that relaxed rules pertaining mortgage loan business.  Particularly, with the 
purpose “to expand homeownership”, federal housing support programs, including 
downpayment assistance as well as insurance and other involvement by federal agencies, were 
boosted under the American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000 and 
American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003.  A related bill was the FHA Multi Family Loan 
Limit Adjustment Act, which aimed to amend the National Housing Act to increase the mortgage 
amount limits applicable to FHA mortgage insurance for multifamily housing located in high-
cost areas.  This bill never became law but passed the House in the 109th Congress.  
Finally, significant changes to personal finance came with the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).  The bill practically made it more 
difficult for people to file for bankruptcy, in particular by pushing borrowers to file a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy (under which the debts are discharged only after the debtor has repaid some portion 
of these debts), instead of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (under which most debts are forgiven or 
discharged). 
Equally important to the passage of key “lax” bills is the fact that a stream of legislation 
proposals aiming to tighten regulations failed to pass the chambers and be enacted despite 
several rounds of attempts.  In particular, bills targeting predatory lending practices and 
advocating consumer protection through education as well as by opening the litigation path for 
lending practices deemed to be unfair were introduced fifteen times in the House of 
Representatives and twice in the Senate, under different but similar names (e.g. Anti-Predatory 
Lending Act of 2000, Consumer Mortgage Protection Act of 2000, etc.).  Only the House version 
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dated 2007 (Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007) was able to pass the 
House but it never got out of the Senate committee.10  
To summarize, one should consider both lax and tight bills in order to get a complete 
picture and look carefully into the alleged regulatory failure.  The following bills were key in 
shaping the financial regulation framework in the run-up to the financial crisis: Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999; Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000; American 
Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000 and American Dream Downpayment 
Act of 2003; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005; Proposals 
aiming to adjust the limits on FHA-insured loans; Anti-predatory lending legislation proposals 
that never got enacted.  In our empirical analysis, we study the bills that were named in the 
lobbying reports, taking this as an indication that the financial industry revealed these bills to be 
relevant to their operations.  In many cases, the bills named in the lobbying reports are different 
versions (‘reincarnations’) of this short list.  The full list of the 47 bills included in the analysis 
and details on these bills are provided in Table A2 of the Supplemental Appendix. 
III.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A.   Data  
By its nature, our analysis requires non-standard data, sometimes only available from non-
traditional sources.  We explain the details of how we obtained our data in this section. 
                                                 
10 The Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, includes 
several provisions from these proposals. 
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Politically Targeted Activities 
Data on PAC contributions are available through the websites of the Federal Election 
Commission (http://www.fec.gov) and the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP, at 
www.opensecrets.org).  PACs can be linked to a corporate or industry sponsor as well as, 
naturally, to a legislator.  We first compile the PAC contributions to each legislator by every 
financial company that lobbied on the bills in our sample (or listed the name of the bill in its 
lobbying report).  Then we sum the contributions to a particular legislator by all the firms 
affected by a particular bill.  Hence, this gives us a measure of PAC contributions at the bill-
legislator level.  Note that we have four congresses in our dataset from 1999 through 2006.  The 
PAC contributions correspond to the election cycle during which the bill in question was 
introduced.  
 Detailed information on lobbying activities is available through lobbying reports from 
the SOPR (http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/opr.htm) and the 
CRP.  A sample report can be found in Table A1 of the Supplemental Appendix.  The reports list 
the name of the firm (e.g., Citigroup in Table A1) and the total dollar amount it spends on 
lobbying activities.  The legislation requires the disclosure not only of the dollar amounts 
actually received/spent, but also of the issues for which lobbying is carried out.  Thus, unlike 
PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures can be associated with targeted policy areas.  Finally, 
the reports must also state the names of the lobbyists that worked on the specific issues reported 
on behalf of the client.  
We extract the lobbying reports filed by financial institutions that engaged in mortgage-
market-related activities either directly (e.g., originating loans) or indirectly (e.g., securitizing 
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loans originated by others).11  Our analysis distinguishes between lobbying activities that are 
related to financial-market-specific issues from other lobbying activities and matches the annual 
amounts to the year the issue of interest was discussed in the congress.  We first concentrate only 
on issues related to the five general issues of interest (accounting, banking, bankruptcy, housing, 
and financial institutions) and then gather information on the specific issues, which are typically 
acts proposed at the House or the Senate, that were listed by the lobbyists as the main issue for 
the lobbying activity.12  Then, we go through these specific issues one by one and determine 
whether an issue can be directly linked to restrictions on mortgage market lending.  For example, 
H.R. 1163 of 2003 (Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act) and H.R. 4471 of 
2005 (Fair and Responsible Lending Act), regulating high-cost mortgages, are bills that we deem 
to be relevant to the mortgage market.  On the other hand, H.R. 2201 of 2005 (Consumer Debt 
Prevention and Education Act) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, although in general related 
to financial services, do not include any provisions directly related to mortgage lending and are 
not classified as mortgage-market-specific issues.  The final set of 47 bills we use in the analysis 
is the comprehensive set of financial-market-related issues mentioned by any of the institutions 
engaged in mortgage-market-related activities in the run-up to the crisis. 
                                                 
11 The mortgage-market-related activities are identified using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database and this 
identification procedure takes into account not only the activities by the institution itself but also the activities by its 
related companies. See Igan, Mishra, Tressel (2011) for more details on the identification of these financial 
institutions. 
12 ‘General issue area codes’ are provided by the SOPR and listed in line 15 of the lobbying reports while the 
‘specific lobbying issues’ are listed in line 16.  See Supplemental Appendix for more details on what the reports 
look like and a full list of the specific issues selected for the analysis. 
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After classifying all listed issues, we calculate lobbying expenditures on specific issues 
by splitting the total amount spent evenly across issues.  To be more precise, we first divide the 
total lobbying expenditure by the number of all general issues and multiply by the number of 
general issues selected.  Then, we divide this by the total number of specific issues listed under 
the five general issues and multiply by the number of specific issues of interest.13  In order to 
illustrate the construction of the final lobbying variable, suppose firm A spends $300, and 
lobbies on 3 general issues (banking and housing – general issues of interest -- and trade – not a 
general issue of interest); it lists 2 specific issues under banking and housing (H.R. 1163, which 
is a relevant specific issue and H.R. 2201, which is not relevant). In this example, the final 
lobbying expenditure variable is calculated as ((300/3)*2)/2)*1=$100. 
We also get the lobbying expenditures by consumer advocacy groups who lobbied on the 
same bills.  We split these expenditures among bills using the same procedure as the one 
explained above.  Note that this procedure may not reflect the “true” amount spent on each issue 
but works as an approximation in the absence of such a split provided in the reports.  We check 
the robustness of our results to an alternative splitting procedure as well as to alternative 
lobbying expenditure measures in Section IV.B. 
                                                 
13 For robustness, we adopt an alternative splitting approach that distributes expenditures using as weights the 
proportion of reports that mention the specific issues of interest.  We also consider lobbying expenditures by the 
financial industry associations.  The list of member firms for each association in the lobbying database is compiled 
by going on each association’s website.  A portion of the associations’ lobbying expenditures is assigned to each 
member firm based on the share of its own spending in the total of all members. 
18 
 
 
 
Network Connections 
We look into whether and how career paths of various legislators, lobbyists, and financial 
executives cross (‘revolving door’).  Our primary measure of network connections captures the 
association between the legislator and the lobbyists working on a particular bill.  The variable is 
measured at the legislator-bill level and uses information on the professional background of the 
lobbyists hired to work on a particular bill.  The names of the lobbyists are extracted from the 
lobbying reports whereas the information on the background of these lobbyists is compiled from 
various sources including the Washington Representatives, a directory published by Columbia 
Books in its suite of www.lobbyists.info products and www.opencongress.org. 
 We call this bill-legislator level variable, ‘Connection between lobbyist and legislator’. 
It is defined as a dummy that equals 1 if at least one of the lobbyists working on a specific bill is 
connected to a particular legislator.  This connection is defined either by the lobbyist having 
worked in that legislator's office ('Connection through legislator's office') or by the lobbyist 
having worked in a committee in which that legislator had a seat ('Connection through 
committee').  Conceptually, this measure is close to the one used in Blanes-Vidal, Draca, and 
Fons-Rosen (2011).  The difference is that they look at the connections from an individual 
lobbyist’s perspective while we construct our variable for each bill-legislator pair by determining 
whether any of the lobbyists that have worked on a particular bill were employed as staffers in 
the office of or in the committee associated with a specific legislator voting on that bill. 
 We also use a legislator-level variable to capture the connectedness of the legislators 
with Wall Street.  This is a dummy that equals 1 if the legislator ever worked in FIRE (capturing 
the networks directly linking Wall Street to Capitol Hill).  Labeled as ‘Worked in Wall Street’, 
the variable is similar in spirit to the definition of connections used in Faccio (2006), Faccio, 
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Masulis and McConnell (2006)Braun and Raddatz (2009).  We further distinguish this measure 
chronologically in an alternative construction so that it reflects whether the legislator worked in 
the financial industry after her time in public office.  These variables are constructed using 
biographical information on the legislators from various sources, including 
www.opencongress.org.  
 Note that, while ‘Connection between lobbyist and legislator’ varies across bills as 
well as across legislators, ‘Worked in Wall Street’ variable is constant across bills.  Hence, our 
estimates of the direct link of connectedness on voting behavior come from the specifications 
where we use the ‘Connection between lobbyist and legislator’ variable. 
Legislator Actions 
There are various points in the legislative process at which a legislator makes her stance on the 
proposed bill known to the others.  Obviously, recorded votes on passage constitute one such 
point but, as mentioned earlier, not all bills get to this final stage.  For those that do (10 out of a 
total of 47 bills), we obtain the roll call records for all senators and representatives from 
www.voteview.com, a website maintained by Keith Poole.  For bills that never make it to the 
final voting stage (or do but do not have recorded votes), it is important to analyze the 
information hidden in the earlier stages of the legislative process.  Put simply, lobbying may alter 
the path a bill takes from the very beginning.  In order to explore what inferences one can make 
based on the observations concerning these bills, we gather data on the sponsorships and co-
sponsorships, which indicate support for a bill.  The source in this case is www.govtrack.us.  
(Co-)sponsorship on a bill often translates into voting in favor of that bill; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 
(2010) also use co-sponsorship information in addition to actual votes in their analysis of 
legislative actions related to the expansion of subprime mortgages. 
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 We go over the details of each of the bills and categorize them into two types: (1) those 
promoting deregulation (‘lax bills’) and (2) those advocating tighter regulation of the activities of 
the lenders (‘tight bills’).  Importantly, not all filers necessarily report their stance on a given 
issue, e.g., whether they support the passage of a bill or not.  Hence, we cannot make the 
distinction between lax and tight bills based on the positions taken by the financial institutions.  
Therefore,  the approach we take is to use the content of the bills themselves to make this 
classification.  The provisions of bills make such a lax-tight classification reasonably 
unambiguous: we define lax bills as those offering more options to the lenders in conducting 
their activities while tight bills impose restrictions on lending activities.  For example, the 
American Dream Downpayment Act opens the door to lower downpayment loans, enhancing 
mortgage lending opportunities, whereas the Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act 
introduces additional disclosure requirements and increases penalties for creditor violations.   
 The bills are further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the 
fact that the bills that end up in the same ‘category’ actually are a ‘reincarnation’ of each other 
(see Table 2 for the individual bill and category names).  Each category and reincarnation pair 
defines an individual bill.  Creating broad bill categories is important for our empirical strategy 
as it allows us to exploit the variation in legislators’ stance across different reincarnations of the 
same bill category. Note that an ideal experiment could be to have two votes for the same bill, 
and compare the same type of action (a recorded vote); however, we do not have two roll calls 
for any of the bills in our sample. Classifying the bills into broad regulation proposals and 
combining the information on sponsorships allows us to conduct an experiment in a similar 
spirit.  
21 
 
 
 
We translate the actions on bills with opposite implications for the financial industry to 
derive a common measure of stance on deregulation so that we can explore the relationship 
between lobbying, connections, and outcomes of the legislative process in a systematic manner.  
So, we construct a binary variable capturing the concept of favoring deregulation, which entails 
expressing support in favor of lax bills and against tight bills.  To put it more precisely, we create 
a variable, “stance in favor of deregulation”, as a dummy that takes the value 1 if on the 
particular lax bill in question, the legislator signed up as a (co-)sponsor or her vote was “aye” 
and 0 if she did not (co-)sponsor the bill or voted “nay”. For a tight bill, this dummy takes a 
value of 1 if the legislator neither signed up as a (co-)sponsor nor her vote was “aye”.  
Our primary dependent variable in the empirical analysis measures the probability of a 
legislator switching her stance from being against to being in favor of deregulation.  It is a 
dummy with value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on 
successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill if the bill was ultimately voted on.  If the bill did not 
have a roll call, then we set the dummy to 1 if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a 
bill to (co-)sponsoring, if.  For example, a legislator is defined to switch her stance if, say, within 
the category of “Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act”, she switches from being against 
the first reincarnation of the bill (H.R. 3901 -- Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2000) to being in 
support of the second reincarnation of the same bill category (H.R. 4213 – Consumer Mortgage 
Protection Act of 2000). Note that if a legislator does not (co-)sponsor a lax bill and ends up 
voting for it in a successive reincarnation, we treat it as a switch in stance. However, such cases 
are limited (only 8 percent of observations with lax bills).  
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B.   Empirical Specification 
The empirical approach we employ aims to exploit the variation across legislators and bills in 
terms of legislative outcomes and lobbying by FIRE.  Our baseline regression equation is as 
follows:  
௜ܵ஻ோ ൌ ߙܮ஻ோ ൅ ߚ ௜ܰ஻ோ ൅ ݏ௜ כ ݐ௖ ൅ ݒ஻ כ ݐ௖ ൅ ߤோ כ ݐ௖ ൅ ߝ௜஻ோ 
 
where ௜ܵ஻ோ is the switch in the stance of the legislator ݅ from being against to being in favor of 
deregulation across successive reincarnations ܴ of the same bill category ܤ.  Note that each pair 
of B and R uniquely identifies an individual bill.  ܮ஻ோ is the log of the total amount of lobbying 
expenditures spent on the bill by the firms that were “affected” by the bill, as revealed by their 
decision to engage in politically targeted activities regarding this bill.  Note also that ܮ஻ோ varies 
at the bill category-reincarnation level but does not vary at the legislator level, because the 
lobbying reports do not provide information on which individual legislators were contacted.  
Notice that, since lobbying expenditures are aggregated, any association we find with switching 
could be interpreted as either the direct link of lobbying to legislator ݅ or the indirect link of 
lobbying to legislator ݆ ് ݅ through strategic interaction among legislators such as bargaining on 
other bills or modification to the bill in question.  ௜ܰ஻ோ is the ‘Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator’, which as discussed above aims to capture the network connections between the 
legislator and the lobbyists working on a particular bill.   
In all the specifications, we employ the interaction between legislator and congress fixed 
effects, ݏ௜ כ ݐ௖.  The legislator fixed effects, ݏ௜, account for time-invariant legislator 
characteristics.  The congress fixed effects, ݐ௖, take into account the particular political 
environment (e.g., the balance between Republicans and Democrats) in a given political cycle, 
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and indirectly, the circumstances in the financial markets and the broader economy, which may 
generate anti- or pro-regulation waves.  For example, if there is any new economic or financial 
information that affects both the probability of switching and lobbying efforts, it would be 
captured by the congress fixed effects.  
Importantly, the interaction terms ݏ௜ כ ݐ௖ control for any legislator characteristics that 
could vary across different congresses; for example, whether the legislator belongs to the same 
party as the chairman of Senate Banking and House Financial Services committees, whether the 
legislator belongs to the majority party.  These would also capture the constituent interests, to the 
extent that these interests are invariant within a congress.  For example, there could be changes in 
legislative priorities across congresses due to a shift in voter preferences. These changes could 
also affect lobbying efforts. Such effects would be controlled for by the interaction term. In 
addition, potential changes in a legislator’s general propensity to switch stances across time (for 
example, because the legislator gains more experience) would also be captured by ݏ௜ כ ݐ௖.  
We also employ the interaction between bill category and congress fixed effects,  ݒ஻ כ ݐ௖.  The bill category fixed effects, ݒ஻, control for any unobserved characteristics of a 
certain regulation proposal.  The inclusion of this set of fixed effects is crucial to our empirical 
strategy as it allows us to compare the change in a legislator’s stance across different 
reincarnations of the same issue.  The interaction terms ݒ஻ כ ݐ௖ would then capture any factor 
that would affect the stance on a given regulation proposal over time.  For instance, a Democrat-
controlled congress may be more in support of the American Dream Downpayment Act than a 
Republican-controlled one, and observing the general stance on a bill may affect an individual 
legislator’s position. 
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Finally, we also include the interaction between reincarnation and congress fixed effects, ߤோ כ ݐ௖.  These control for unobserved reincarnation-specific effects, for example, increasing 
probability of a switch on later reincarnations due to more aggressive lobbying or longer 
negotiation and bargaining or learning about others’ positions by observing the votes in the 
earlier reincarnations. In other words, if there is a tendency towards increased lobbying and, at 
the same time, a tendency towards increasing support for a bill across successive reincarnations, 
the reincarnation fixed effects would capture such common trends. However, as we discuss 
below, we do not necessarily observe increasing lobbying expenditures across successive 
reincarnations.  
Given that our empirical strategy is based on utilizing variation in a legislator’s stance 
across successive reincarnations within a bill-category, we cannot introduce individual bill 
(ݒ஻ כ ߤோሻ fixed effects.  In order to account for certain bill characteristics, we include in all the 
specifications, a proxy for the complexity of the bill.  Arguably, more complex bills are likely to 
be associated with more intense lobbying and discussions.  At the same time, the complexity of a 
bill may also be linked to the likelihood of a legislator switching her stance because, e.g., the 
legislator may take more time to absorb the content of all the provisions and make a decision.  
We construct a measure of complexity by calculating the total number of pages that describe and 
contain the full text of a bill.  In addition, all regressions include a dummy for tight bills. 
Finally, the standard errors in all the regressions are clustered at the legislator-level to 
account for the correlation in a legislator’s stance across different issues.14  
                                                 
14 Our results are robust to clustering at the bill-category and legislator-category levels. 
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IV.   RESULTS 
A.   First Look 
As shown in Table 1, between 1999 and 2006, interest groups have spent on average about $4.2 
billion per political cycle on targeted political activity, which includes PAC campaign 
contributions and lobbying expenditures.  Lobbying expenditures represent by far the bulk of all 
interest groups’ money spent on targeted political activity (close to 90 percent).  Expenditures by 
FIRE companies constitute roughly 15 percent of overall lobbying expenditures in any election 
cycle.  Approximately 10 percent of all firms that lobbied during this time period were associated 
with FIRE. Notably, overall lobbying expenditures as well as expenditures by FIRE have 
increased by roughly two-thirds between 1999 and 2009.15  
All these indicate that, during our sample period, FIRE was one of the most politically-
active industries.  The focus of these intense activities was a small set of regulation proposals.  In 
particular, when bills with the same/similar name introduced more than once are consolidated 
together in one broad concept category, there were only six proposals that lobbying activities of 
the financial industry targeted.  Partially as a reflection of the legislative process, these proposals 
were introduced in various reincarnations, sometimes as frequently as 15 times.  As summarized 
in Table 2, lobbying efforts on different reincarnations within a bill category are somewhat 
evenly distributed across time.  Hence, lobbying on a particular issue is not necessarily front- or 
back-loaded and seems to be quite persistent through the attempts to turn a proposal into law.   
                                                 
15 Drutman (2010) describes the growth of modern corporate lobbying and argues that corporate lobbying activity is 
likely to continue to expand in the future, with large corporations playing an increasingly central role in the 
formulation of national policies. 
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As a first pass in looking into the relationship between the financial industry’s politically 
targeted efforts and financial regulation during 1999-2006, we calculate the probability that a bill 
ultimately gets signed into law.  Table 3 presents these results.  On the individual bills, no tight 
bill passed both chambers of Congress and ultimately got signed into law while 16 percent of the 
lax bills did.  This difference is even more striking when individual bills are grouped into 
common concept categories.  Actually, the majority of lax regulation proposals (three out of five) 
were ultimately signed into law whereas none of the tight regulation proposals succeeded.  
Perhaps even more striking is the fact that anti-predatory lending consumer protection proposals 
were never signed into law in spite of 15 attempts (Table 2). 
In what follows, we analyze whether the pattern shown in Table 3 survives formal 
econometric analysis.  Summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis are 
shown in Table 4.  In total, we consider 47 bills in the analysis.16 In the four congresses covered 
in our dataset, there were 790 legislators that voted on at least one of these bills.  FIRE 
companies hired 575 lobbyists to lobby on these bills.  On average, roughly $4 million were 
spent on a bill.17  The bill with highest lobbying spending by the FIRE was H.R. 833 Responsible 
Lending Act introduced in the 108th Congress as the 9th reincarnation of Predatory Lending 
Consumer Protection Act.  In comparison, campaign contributions by the affected firms to the 
                                                 
16 Initially, we identify 51 relevant bills discussed in the period between 1999 and 2006.  However, four of these 
bills are dropped in the analysis due to various data issues, see Supplemental Appendix for details.  
17 Note that this statistic is not for the aggregate amount spent by the financial firms which lobbied on the bills in our 
sample.  Rather, it is for the part of the aggregate amount we allocate to the bills in question by these firms.  The 
aggregate lobbying expenditure by the affected firms on all bills was three times as large. 
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legislators were minuscule standing approximately at an average of $2,000.  Lobbying 
expenditure by the “other side”, i.e., the consumer organizations, was also very small (roughly 
$20,000) compared to the amount spent by the financial firms.  Of all the legislators in the data 
set, 14 percent are connected to Wall Street.  Among the bill-legislator observations, 32 percent 
indicate a connection between the legislator and the lobbyists working on the bill.  Overall, 
connections between Wall Street and Capitol Hill (as illustrated by the ‘Worked in Wall Street’ 
variable) and the ‘Connection between lobbyist and legislator’ variable) are not rare occurrences 
and there is enough variation in these measures for regression analysis.  Looking at the 
dependent variable, the switch from being opposed to deregulation to being in favor occurs in 6 
percent of the legislator-bill category-reincarnation observations.18  Importantly, these switch 
cases are not confined to a particular group of legislators or a particular bill category.  In fact, the 
switch cases are spread across all bill categories and 71 percent of the legislators have switched 
at least once. 
B.   Regression Analysis 
Main Findings 
The results from estimating our baseline specification, Equation (1), are presented in Table 5.  
We find a statistically significant, positive association between money spent on lobbying for a 
particular bill and legislators switching their stance in favor of deregulation (Table 5, Column 
                                                 
18 Note that this fraction goes up to 10 percent in the specifications where certain non-switch cases are dropped. See 
the discussion of alternative dependent variables in Section IV.B. 
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I).19  This association is also significant in economic terms: a one standard deviation increase in 
log lobbying expenditures corresponds to a 37 percentage-point increase in the probability of a 
legislator switching to being in favor of deregulation. 
 Network connections between the legislators and the lobbyists also have a link to 
securing a switch in favor of deregulation.  Specifically, if the lobbyist hired to contact the 
legislator on a bill has an employment history connecting the lobbyist to that legislator, the 
higher the likelihood that the legislator switches her stance (Table 5, Column II).  On average, 
connections between the lobbyist and the legislator are associated with an increase in the 
probability of switching in favor of deregulation by 2.5 percentage points. 
 In Columns III and IV, we investigate whether this association between lobbying and 
switching is stronger when it occurs through connected rather than unconnected lobbyists.  The 
coefficient on lobbying almost doubles when the lobbying money is spent through connected 
lobbyists.  In other words, connected lobbyists are twice as efficient.  This finding is consistent 
with others in the literature emphasizing the importance of the value of connections.    
 Next, we explore how legislator characteristics affect the relationship between 
lobbying, hiring connected lobbyists and the probability of changing a legislator’s stance.  We 
estimate a specification where we introduce the interaction between the lobbying and connection 
variables, and a measure of legislators’ conservative tendencies.  We borrow the DW-nominate 
variable calculated by Poole and Rosenthal (2007).  These ideology scores are higher for more 
conservative legislators.  As an alternative to the ideology score, we use a dummy variable that is 
                                                 
19 Our results are robust to estimation by probit.  However, we prefer the linear probability model as our baseline as 
introducing fixed effects in a probit model may be prone to inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameter 
problem (Chamberlain, 1984).  
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1 if the legislator is a Republican.  The interaction of the legislator’s conservatism and lobbying 
has a positive and significant coefficient (Table 6, Columns I and II).  Hence, higher lobbying 
expenditures may be more effective in persuading more conservative legislators.  For the most 
conservative legislator, a one standard deviation increase in log lobbying expenditures is 
associated with a 39.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of taking a stance in favor of 
deregulation (Table 6, Column I).  However, the ideology of the legislator does not change the 
relationship between connections and switching (Table 6, Columns III and IV).  This may 
indicate that, irrespective of their ideology, all legislators are equally likely to be influenced by a 
lobbyist who is connected to them. 
 Then, we look into how legislator’s work experience comes into play with the 
relationship we have established between lobbying and switching in favor of deregulation.  The 
link between lobbying expenditures to voting patterns is enhanced by the legislators’ experience 
in Wall Street (Table 6, Column V).  In particular, lobbying is more likely to be associated with a 
positive probability of moving votes towards deregulation if the legislator ever worked in the 
financial industry.  For legislators that are “Wall Street insiders”, lobbying is linked to a 2.1 
percentage-point higher probability of taking a stance in favor of deregulation.  The results 
appear to be driven by experience prior to taking office (Table 6, Column VI).  Specifically, 
working in Wall Street after serving in Congress does not enhance the link between lobbying and 
the probability of switching.  Hence, we do not find any evidence suggesting that the promise of 
a job in Wall Street affects stance on regulation.  Rather, legislators that have financial industry 
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work experience are more likely than those that do not to change their position by lobbying on a 
deregulation proposal.20 
 PAC contributions have been commonly used in the literature to measure politically 
targeted activities.  Although the magnitude of PAC contributions is small relative to lobbying 
expenditures and PAC contributions cannot be linked to particular issues, the distinctive feature 
of these contributions is that they are linked to particular legislators, and thus, may influence 
individual voting patterns directly.  Therefore, we repeat the analysis in Table 5 using PAC 
contributions by affected firms instead of lobbying expenditures.21  Table 7 shows the results.  
While the findings are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 5 and 6, the estimated effects are 
much smaller in magnitude.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in log PAC 
contributions is associated with only a 0.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of 
switching in favor of deregulation (Table 7, Column I).   
 There are two plausible explanations for the weaker links between campaign 
contributions and voting patterns.  First, PAC contributions themselves are minuscule compared 
to lobbying expenditures (Table 4).  Second, endogeneity is potentially more of a concern.22  
                                                 
20 We also looked at whether the legislator’s K Street experience enhances the link between lobbying and switching: 
18 percent of legislators have such experience and 92 percent of those with K Street experience acquire such 
experience following their public service. We did not find any significant coefficient on the interaction of K Street 
experience and lobbying, even for experience as a lobbyist after public office. 
21 PAC contributions by affected firms and lobbying expenditures on a given bill are positively correlated so we 
prefer not to include both in the same specification. The results are unchanged when we do. 
22 Endogeneity concerns could be addressed more directly if we restrict the sample only to the legislators that 
announce their decision not to run for office in the next election cycle.  Unfortunately, we do not have enough 
(continued…) 
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This is because we construct this variable at the bill-legislator level.  In particular, PAC 
contributions are targeted to particular political candidates.  Hence, the affected firms may 
allocate their contributions based on the likelihood with which they think the candidate will act 
in favor of deregulation once she comes into office.  By comparison, lobbying expenditures are 
targeted to particular issues rather than explicitly to particular legislators and are measured at the 
bill level, alleviating some of the endogeneity concerns but, unfortunately, not fully eliminating 
all of them. 
In a nutshell, the analysis points to strong evidence that the likelihood of a legislator 
changing her stance on financial regulation proposals introduced in the run-up to the crisis was 
linked to the lobbying efforts and network connections.  In addition, the evidence suggests that 
spending more by hiring connected lobbyists rather than unconnected ones gets the financial 
industry more bang for their buck.   
Robustness 
Alternative controls 
Although we control for unobserved time-invariant and time-varying legislator, bill category and 
reincarnation characteristics in the baseline specification, we cannot introduce bill category-
reincarnation or legislator-bill category-reincarnation fixed effects.  In what follows, we discuss 
several factors that could be influencing the probability of switch and the intensity of lobbying 
that vary along these dimensions and check the robustness of our results to these factors.   
                                                                                                                                                             
observations for such an analysis since we have only 37 legislators announcing their retirement in our sample period 
to run our baseline specification with the full set of fixed effects. In a specification without any fixed effects, we do 
find a statistically significant positive association between the probability of switching and PAC contributions. 
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Voting history of the legislator 
Reputational or public image concerns may influence legislators to keep a consistent stance on a 
particular issue.  Hence, the probability of switching in subsequent reincarnations of the same 
bill may be affected by how the legislator voted on the earlier versions.  At the same time, 
legislators’ voting record could influence the intensity of lobbying activities on a given bill.  In 
order to address this concern, we introduce a variable indicating the stance of the legislator on a 
particular bill in the previous three reincarnations.  The coefficients on lobbying expenditures 
and connections are mostly unchanged although we do find evidence that the voting history of 
the legislator is related to her probability of switching (Table 9, Columns I and II).  Particularly, 
if a legislator has been against a deregulation proposal in the past, she is more likely to switch to 
being in favor.  This may indicate that legislators take time to learn more about a bill before 
deciding to switch. 
 
Voting along party lines 
Legislators may also switch their position on a particular bill not because of lobbying but 
because a large number of their party members decide to support a deregulation bill.  In order to 
control for the switch occurring due to such “herd behavior”, we add a variable that is 
constructed as the number of legislators in the same party as the particular legislator that decide 
to switch.  The results, shown in Table 9, Columns III and IV, affirm that the importance of 
lobbying and connections in explain the probability of switch even after controlling for potential 
pressure from other party members. 
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Modifications to the bill across reincarnations 
Another possible explanation for a legislator to be initially against deregulation but then show 
support could be the changes to the content of the bill as it evolves across successive 
reincarnations.  Note also that the content of a bill may change precisely due to lobbying 
efforts.23  We introduce the number of new amendments added to a bill in its successive 
reincarnations to address this issue.  The coefficient on lobbying expenditures remains positive 
and significant but reduces by almost a third, which suggests that additional amendments are 
indeed correlated with lobbying expenditures (Table 9, Columns V and VI).  
 
Lobbying by those other than the financial industry 
Does lobbying by the “other side” or opposing forces affect our results?  Unfortunately, it is hard 
to find a good measure of the opposing forces because these may include not only financial 
institutions that are against deregulation and organized special interest groups (e.g., consumer 
organizations) but also other interested parties whose lobbying may go totally unreported (e.g., 
federal bank supervisors or the general public).  In particular, we would ideally have a measure 
that captures the strength of opposition to a proposed bill from the regulators and the general 
                                                 
23 Another reason for modifications to the bill may also be a consequence of strategic interactions among legislators 
where those in favor of deregulation agree to modify the bill in order to get other legislators on board.   
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public as well as the groups that lobby on their behalf.24  In the absence of such a measure, we 
use data on lobbying activity by consumer organizations to construct a proxy for such opposing 
forces.  In particular, we construct an indicator variable that is 1 if lobbying expenditures by 
consumer organizations on a given bill is positive.25  
 Interestingly, we find that lobbying by consumer organizations is positively correlated 
with lobbying by the financial industry as well as the probability of switching a legislator’s 
stance in favor of deregulation (Table 9, Columns VII and VIII).  This seems to suggest that 
lobbying by consumer organizations works in the same direction as lobbying by the financial 
industry.  One explanation for this finding could be that some of the bills under consideration 
were perceived to be consumer-friendly as well.  For example, bills promoting lower down 
payment requirements to enhance home ownership also helped many constrained borrowers take 
out mortgages.  Importantly, the coefficient on lobbying by the financial industry remains 
unchanged. 
 
Momentum for deregulation 
                                                 
24 Another way of putting this is thinking of the analogous case of the financial firms: lobbying by the industry 
associations is part of the effort these firms exert on a proposed bill. As noted above, we check the robustness of our 
findings by including the lobbying expenditures by these associations. 
25 There are very few consumer groups who report lobbying on mortgage-market related issues. Also, their spending 
is quantitatively very small – on average, they spend about $20,000 on a bill, which is less than one percent of the 
spending by the financial industry on these issues. Moreover, they lobby on only a small set of bills (roughly one-
third). 
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One could argue that there has been a pro-finance shift in sentiment, and at the same time 
lobbying expenditures have been steadily increasing (e.g. see Drutman, 2010); and that our 
estimates capture this unobserved latent momentum in support for deregulation and incentives 
for firms to lobby. Note that congress fixed effects control for any such common momentum in 
deregulation as well as lobbying over time (as long as it affects all legislators and bill-
categories). However, we also explicitly control for a time trend (Table 9, Columns IX and X). 
We continue to find a strong and positive link. Another argument could be that momentum for 
deregulation may emerge within a congress. Such effects would be captured by  ߤோ כ ݐ௖ 
interactions. 
 
Alternative dependent variables 
The dependent variables in all the regressions above is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the legislator’s stance changes from being against to being in favor of deregulation.  In all 
other cases, the dummy variable takes a value of zero.  The dummy variable takes a value of zero 
if the legislator switched her stance from being in favor to going against deregulation, or if the 
legislator did not change her stance (she was initially against in the previous reincarnation and 
remained against in the current reincarnation; or if she was initially for deregulation, and 
remained so).  For robustness, we take a closer look at these alternatives.  We construct two 
alternative dependent variables restricting the cases where the dummy can take a value of zero.  
First, we drop those observations where the legislator sways her vote from being in favor to 
moving against deregulation, i.e., the relevant comparison is only between those who switch and 
those who stay put.  Second, we further refine the comparison group, and the dummy variable 
takes a value of zero only for those observations where the legislator was against deregulation in 
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the previous reincarnation of the bill and continues to remain against in the current reincarnation.  
The results are shown in Columns I-IV of Table 10.  The estimated coefficients on the lobbying 
variable continue to be positive and statistically significant.  The magnitudes are similar to the 
baseline regressions presented in Table 5.  Yet, we do find weaker link for connections when we 
restrict the comparison group to those observations where the initial stance of the legislator is 
against deregulation.  Next, we focus specifically on the switch in stance from being in favor to 
going against deregulation.  We ask the question: do lobbying and network connections matter 
also in swaying the vote in the opposite direction?  The evidence does suggest so for lobbying 
expenditures: more intensive lobbying does indeed reduce the probability that the legislator 
switches her stance from being in favor to going against deregulation (Table 10, Columns V-VI).  
Connections, again, seem to play a smaller role in explaining the switch in the opposite direction.  
 Next, instead of the switch variable being a dummy, we define the switch in stance as 
taking 3 values: -1 if there is a switch from being against to being in favor of deregulation; 0 if 
the stance remains the same, and +1 if the stance switches from being against to moving in favor 
of deregulation. The results shown in Table 10, Columns VII-VIII, suggest that the lobbying 
continues to have a strong and positive link to swaying votes towards deregulation, and the link 
for connections remains robust. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on lobbying is larger 
than that in the baseline specification (Table 5, Column I).  
 In all the regressions so far, our dependent variable is the switch in the stance of the 
legislator. Another relevant question we can ask is whether lobbying and connections have any 
link to the level of the legislator’s position (rather than the switch).  In order to address this 
question, we repeat our baseline regression changing the dependent variable to a dummy equal to 
one if the legislator is in favor of deregulation (i.e., expressing support in favor of lax bills and 
37 
 
 
 
against tight bills). The results shown in Columns IX and X in Table 10 suggest that lobbying 
and connections are also significantly related to the position of the legislator.  Note that the 
coefficient on lobbying is smaller than the baseline regression in Table 5, Column 1.  Thus, 
lobbying seems to have a greater association with switching the legislators’ position than with 
the position itself.  One possible explanation for this finding is that lobbying is more likely to be 
endogenous to the position of the legislator rather than the switch in his stance.  
Finally, in the baseline specification, following the previous literature (Mian, Sufi, and 
Trebbi, 2010) we used the information on sponsorships to create a measure of the broad stance 
for deregulation. One can argue that sponsorship may not be an accurate indicator of voting 
behavior. What if the restrict the analysis to only those bills which have recorded data on votes?  
In a restricted specification with a smaller set of fixed effects, we constrain the analysis only to 
such observations. The coefficient on lobbying (shown in Column XI, Table 10) remains robust, 
the magnitude being similar to the baseline specification. But we do not have enough variation to 
look at the link for connections (while controlling for all time-invariant legislator 
characteristics).  
 
Alternative explanatory variables 
We conduct robustness tests for sensitivity to the measurement of lobbying expenditures by 
recalculating this variable by: (i) taking into account lobbying expenditures by bankers’ and 
other industry associations, (ii) not splitting lobbying expenditures by individual bills, and (iii) 
splitting lobbying expenditures among individual bills based on weights indicated by the share of 
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reports filed by the firm in which a bill was listed.  Table 11 presents the results, attesting that 
the findings from Table 5 remain largely unaltered. 26   
Discussion of Findings 
Do our results imply that the lobbying efforts of the financial industry were “successful”?  Recall 
that the lobbying reports do not always explicitly state the stance of the filer on a given issue, 
e.g., whether it supports the passage of a bill or not.  There could be financial institutions that are 
against deregulation; for example, lenders with more prudent standards may prefer tighter rules 
to suppress competition by less prudent lenders.  However, if we make the plausible assumption 
that the financial institutions were on average in favor of deregulation, our empirical results 
suggest that the lobbying efforts were successful in obtaining this outcome.  Such an assumption 
indeed seems plausible since some financial institutions explicitly state their position on certain 
bills: for example, Bear Stearns in lobbying on the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory 
Lending Act expressed that “advocated the concepts in the proposal but not the proposal”. 
Although our specification exploits variation in voting patterns for a given legislator on 
the same issue, can we interpret the findings as evidence of a causal relationship?  One might 
                                                 
26 In addition to the robustness checks discussed so far, we also do the following: (i) split the sample for tight and 
lax bills, (ii) split the sample for House and Senate bills, and (iii) control for lobbying expenditures by affected firms 
on issues unrelated to financial regulation. The positive and statistically significant coefficients on lobbying 
expenditures and connections survive these robustness checks.  We also check the robustness of the results in 
Columns III-IV of Table 5 to alternative dependent and explanatory variables and controlling for lobbying by the 
other side. The finding that lobbying is more strongly associated with switching when connected lobbyists are hired 
is robust. Finally, we use the change in log lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions (rather than levels in the 
baseline regressions) across successive reincarnations and obtain significant and positive effect of connections and 
lobbying. These results are available upon request.  
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argue that lobbying efforts are allocated towards legislators that already have an inherent 
tendency to switch their stance in favor deregulation, and hence we may be overestimating the 
effect of lobbying.  Several considerations ameliorate but, unfortunately, do not fully eradicate 
such reverse-causality concerns.  First, such tendencies would be captured by the legislator and 
congress fixed effects and their interactions in our empirical specification.  Second, lobbying 
expenditures are not measured at the legislator level.  The information we obtain from the 
lobbying reports does not include any reference to particular legislators.27  Hence, lobbying 
expenditure on a bill as a whole is unlikely to be directly influenced by voting patterns of any 
specific legislator.  
Similar endogeneity concerns may apply to network connections.  One can argue that a 
lobbyist’s decision to work for a particular legislator may be influenced by the legislator’s 
tendency to switch.  However, connections are determined based on past employment histories.  
Therefore, they are not likely to be affected by voting patterns on particular regulation proposals 
in the future.   
One can also argue that firms may be likely to hire lobbyists who are connected to 
legislators with a higher inclination to switch.  Several factors alleviate such endogeneity 
concerns.  First, such tendencies would be captured by the legislator and congress fixed effects 
and their interactions in our empirical specification.  Second, when we look at the choice of 
hiring lobbyists, we see a reasonable degree of persistence.  Specifically, the percent of lobbyists 
                                                 
27 The LDA does not require a description of the specific recipients of and the specific activities funded by lobbying 
money.  It is possible that certain legislators are contacted more often or lobbied more aggressively. However, if the 
lobbying activity involves “research and background work” to create arguments for or against a regulation proposal, 
information generated by such activities is likely to be accessible by other legislators as well. 
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who worked on successive reincarnations (i.e., worked on nth and (n-1)th reincarnations) within 
the same bill category is very high (Table 8).  For example, at least 90 percent of the lobbyists 
working on a reincarnation of the American Dream Downpayment Act had also worked on the 
previous reincarnation.  Given this persistence, it would be hard to argue that firms 
systematically change their lobbyist-hiring patterns based on legislators’ stance.  
That said, the data and the empirical setup does not allow us to fully rule out other 
stories, e.g., if lobbying efforts are focused on proposals that are close calls or are the subject of 
intense debate and, as such more likely to be re-written, because we do not observe voting twice 
on the same exact bill but only in their similar versions (‘reincarnations’).  Overall, it may seem 
to be the case that lobbying and network connections sway votes from being against to being in 
favor of deregulation rather than the tendency to switch positions on a bill determining lobbying 
expenditures and how connections are established.  But the evidence is not definitive in 
establishing this causal link.   
V.   CONCLUSION 
Regulatory failure has been the subject of intense debate in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis. In this paper, we take a closer look into the financial regulation proposals prior to the 
crisis and analyze how political influence was linked to the congressional actions on these 
proposals. 
 We use a detailed dataset that summarizes the politically targeted activities of the 
financial industry from 1999 to 2006, which includes the bills targeted, lobbyists hired, lobbying 
expenditures and campaign contributions, and measures of network connections of lobbyists and 
financial firms with legislators. We document that the probability of a bill advocating regulations 
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less favorable to the financial industry being passed was lower than that of a bill promoting 
deregulation.   
 We provide robust evidence that lobbying expenditures by the affected firms and 
network connections between lobbyists and legislators were associated with whether the 
legislators switched their stance in favor of these bills.  Additionally, hiring connected lobbyists 
significantly enhances this association.  
 These results give support to the notion that political influence of the financial industry 
may have played a role in shaping the regulatory landscape in the run-up to the crisis and that 
financial reform proposals should not be considered in isolation from these political economy 
factors. 
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Election cycle 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06
Contributions from PACs 326 348 461 509
Overall lobbying expenditure 2,972 3,348 4,081 4,747
Of which  expenditure by finance, insurance, and real 
estate industry (FIRE) 437 478 645 720
Share of FIRE in overall lobbying (in percent) 14.7 14.3 15.8 15.2
Total targeted political activity 3,298 3,696 4,542 5,256
Source: Center for Responsive Politics.
Table 1. Targeted Political Activity Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures
(millions of dollars)
 
 
 
 
Reincarnation     \  Category 
Commodity 
Futures 
Modernization 
Act
Bankruptcy 
Abuse 
Prevention and 
Consumer 
Protection Act
 American 
Dream 
Downpayment 
Act 
FHA Multifamily 
Housing 
Mortgage Loan 
Limit Adjustment 
Act 
 Predatory 
Lending 
Consumer 
Protection Act 
 Financial 
Services 
Regulatory Relief 
Act
1 52 30 10 14 5 4
2 29 1 8 17 4 27
3 19 1 18 5 5 14
4 11 19 3 5 19
5 34 7 52 10 20
6 22 7 8 2 17
7 1 3 6
8 14 4
9 9 29
10 5 6
11 3
12 6
13 11
14 1
15 3
Table 2. Lobbying Expenditures on Reincarnations of Bills 
Notes: The bills are grouped into six categories based on their similarities in their titles, descriptions, and provisions. Each attempt to pass a bill 
in a given category is labeled as a 'reincarnation'. The names of the bills brought forward in various attempts under the same broad concept are 
as follows: Commodity Futures Modernization Act – 1. H.R. 4541, 2. S. 2697, 3. H.R. 5660; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act – 1. H.R. 975, 2. H.R. 1529, 3. H.R. 1860, 4. S. 1920, 5. S. 256, 6. H.R. 685, 7. H.R. 2060; American Dream 
Downpayment Act – 1. H.R. 1776, 2. H.R. 5640, 3. H.R. 3206, 4. S. 1620, 5. H.R.1276, 6. S.811, 7. H.R. 3755,  8. H.R. 5121, 9. S. 
3535, 10. S. 2169; FHA Multifamily Housing Mortgage Loan Limit Adjustment Act – 1. H.R. 1629, 2. S. 1163, 3. H.R. 4110, 4. H.R. 176, 
5. H.R. 1461, 6. H.R. 5503; Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act – 1. H.R. 3901, 2. H.R. 4213, 3. H.R. 4250, 4. S. 2415, 5. H.R. 
1051, 6. H.R. 3607, 7. S. 2438, 8. H.R. 4818, 9. H.R. 833, 10. H.R. 1663, 11. H.R. 1865, 12. H.R. 1182, 13. H.R. 1295, 14. H.R. 2201, 
15. H.R. 4471; Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act – 1. H.R. 665, 2. S. 900, 3. H.R. 3951, 4. H.R. 1375, 5. H.R. 3505, 6. S. 2856.
(in percent of total spent on all attempts)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tight bill?
Total number 
of bills Tight bill?
Total number 
of categories
No Yes No Yes
No 84% 16% 32 No 40% 60% 5
Yes 100% 0% 15 Yes 100% 0% 1
Total number of bills 42 5 47 Total number of categories 3 3 6
Notes: The table shows the proportion and number of bills that were ultimately signed into law between 2000 and 2006, 
distinguishing between lax and tight bills. Bills are categorized as lax or tight based on the rules they would impose on the financial 
institutions. In the last three columns, we group the bills into six categories: Commodity Futures Modernization Act; Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act; American Dream Downpayment Act; FHA Multifamily Housing Mortgage Loan 
Limit Adjustment Act; Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act; Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act.
Table 3. Passage of Bills
Individual Bills Bills Categorized
Signed into law? Signed into law?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of bills 47
Number of legislators 790
Number of lobbyists 575
Dummy=1 if switch to being in favor of deregulation 32390 0.06 0.24 0 1
Dummy=1 if stance in favor of deregulation 32390 0.39 0.49 0 1
Dummy=1 if roll call vote in favor of deregulation 3006 0.69 0.46 0 1
Lobbying expenditures (in US$) 32390 3,896,924 3,788,612 262,374 14,700,000
Lobbying expenditures (in log) 32390 14.70 1.03 12.48 16.51
PAC contributions (in US$) 32390 2,341 5,983 1 83,861
PAC contributions (in log) 32390 2.96 3.98 0.00 11.34
Lobbying expenditures by consumer organizations (in US$) 32390 22,149 67,172 1 287,260
Lobbying expenditures by consumer organizations (in log) 32390 3.04 4.47 0.00 12.57
Ideology score 31406 0.08 -0.47 0.76 1.09
Republican 32226 0.52 0.50 0 1
Worked in Wall Street 32390 0.14 0.35 0 1
Worked in Wall Street after Congress 32390 0.05 0.21 0 1
Connection between lobbyist and legislator 32390 0.33 0.47 0 1
Connection through legislator's office 32390 0.33 0.47 0 1
Connection through committee 32390 0.07 0.25 0 1
Connected lobbyists 32390 0.90 2.09 0 24
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Notes: All bills are classified as lax or tight based on the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more 
details). The bills are further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in the same 
'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and category names). Note that each category and 
reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. The dummy for 'switch to being in favor of deregulation' takes on the value 1 if the legislator 
changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and 
if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. The dummy for 'stance in 
favor of deregulation' takes on the value 1 if the legislator voted 'aye' ('nay') on a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if 
the legislator sponsored or consponsored a bill, if the bill did not have a roll call. Lobbying expenditures are the total amount spent on 
lobbying on a particular bill by the financial firms that list the bill in their reports ('the affected firms'). Lobbying expenditures at the firm 
level for each specific bill is calculated by splitting the expenditure of that firm equally among all bills the firm lobbied on. Lobbying 
expenditures by consumer organizations are calculated in a similar manner. PAC contributions are the total amount given to a particular 
legislator's PACs by the affected firms, split across bills using the lobbying expenditure by a particular firm on that bill as weights. The 
'Ideology score' is DW-nominate, calculated by Poole and Rosenthal (2007). Higher values of this variable corresponds to a more 
conservative political line. Republican is a dummy that equals 1 for legislators in the GOP, 0 for Democrats, and is set to missing for 
independents. Network connections are measured using the employment histories of both the legislators and the lobbyists. The variable 
'Worked in Wall Street (after Congress)' is a dummy that equals 1 if the legislator has ever worked for a finance, insurance, or real 
estate firm (after s/he left public office). The variable 'Connection between lobbyist and legislator' is a dummy that equals 1 if a lobbyist 
working on a specific bill is connected to a particular legislator. This connection is defined either by the lobbyist having worked in that 
legislator's office ('Connection through legislator's office') or by the lobbyist having worked in a committee in which that legislator had a 
seat ('Connection through committee'). The variable 'Connected lobbyists' shows the number of lobbyists working on a specific bill that 
is connected to a particular legislator. 
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I II III IV
Full sample Full sample
Unconnected 
lobbyists
Connected 
lobbyists
0.370*** 0.262*** 0.464***
[0.016] [0.023] [0.061]
0.025***
[0.004]
Observations 32390 32390 21662 10728
R-squared 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.62
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Table 5. Lobbying, Connections, and Probability of Switch to Being in Favor of Deregulation
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or tight based on 
the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more details). The bills are further 
grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in the same 
'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and category names). Note 
that each category and reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. The dependent variable is a dummy with 
value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on successive reincarnations of a lax 
(tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-
)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. Lobbying expenditures are the total amount spent on lobbying on 
a particular bill by the financial firms that list the bill in their reports ('the affected firms'), expressed in natural 
logs. Lobbying expenditures at the firm level for each specific bill is calculated by splitting the expenditure of that 
firm equally among all bills the firm lobbied on. 'Connection between lobbyist and legislator' is a dummy that 
equals 1 if a lobbyist working on a specific bill is connected to a particular legislator. This connection is defined 
either by the lobbyist having worked in that legislator's office or by the lobbyist having worked in a committee in 
which that legislator had a seat. In columns I and II, the regression is estimated on the full sample. In column III, 
the regression is estimated using only the observations where the legislator and the lobbyists are not connected. 
In column IV, the regression is estimated using only the observations where the legislator and the lobbyists are 
connected. All regressions include 'Bill complexity', defined as the total number of pages that describe and 
contain the full text of a bill, expressed in logs, and a dummy that is 1 if the bill is classified as tight. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if stance changes from against to in favor of deregulation
Lobbying expenditures
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator
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I II III IV V VI
0.381*** 0.363*** 0.367*** 0.370***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
0.016***
[0.005]
0.016***
[0.005]
0.024*** 0.024***
[0.005] [0.006]
0.000
[0.009]
0.001
[0.009]
0.021***
[0.007]
-0.002
[0.012]
Observations 31406 32226 31406 32226 32390 32390
R-squared 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 6. Probability of Switch and Legislator Characteristics
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if stance changes from against to in favor of deregulation
Lobbying expenditures
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator * Ideology score
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator
Lobbying expenditures * Republican
Lobbying expenditures * Worked in 
Wall Street
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or tight based on the rules 
they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more details). The bills are further grouped into six 
categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in the same 'category' actually are 
'reincarnation' of each other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and category names). Note that each category and 
reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. The dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the legislator changed her 
vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, 
and if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. 
Lobbying expenditures are the total amount spent on lobbying on a particular bill by the financial firms that list the bill in 
their reports ('the affected firms'), expressed in natural logs. Lobbying expenditures at the firm level for each specific bill 
is calculated by splitting the expenditure of that firm equally among all bills the firm lobbied on. 'Connection between 
lobbyist and legislator' is a dummy that equals 1 if a lobbyist working on a specific bill is connected to a particular 
legislator. This connection is defined either by the lobbyist having worked in that legislator's office or by the lobbyist 
having worked in a committee in which that legislator had a seat. The 'Ideology score' is DW-nominate, calculated by 
Poole and Rosenthal (2007). Higher values of this variable corresponds to a more conservative political line. 
'Republican' is a dummy that equals 1 for legislators that are a member of the GOP, 0 for members of the Democratic 
Party, and is set to missing for independents. 'Worked in Wall Street' is a dummy that equals 1 if the legislator has ever 
worked for a finance, insurance, or real estate firm. All regressions include 'Bill complexity', defined as the total number 
of pages that describe and contain the full text of a bill, expressed in logs, and a dummy that is 1 if the bill is classified as 
tight. Robust standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Lobbying expenditures * Ideology 
score
Lobbying expenditures * Worked in 
Wall Street after Congress
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator * Republican
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I II III IV V
0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.004***
[0.001]
0.003***
[0.001]
0.004***
[0.001]
-0.002
[0.002]
Observations 32390 31406 32226 32390 32390
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Table 7. Probability of Switch and PAC Contributions
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if stance changes from against to in favor of deregulation
PAC contributions
PAC contributions * Ideology score
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or tight based 
on the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more details). The bills are 
further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in 
the same 'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and 
category names). Note that each category and reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. The dependent 
variable is a dummy with value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on 
successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if the legislator switched 
from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. PAC contributions, 
expressed in logs, are the total amount given to a particular legislator's PACs by the affected firms, as 
determined by whether the firm named the bill in its lobbying report and split across bills using the lobbying 
expenditure by a particular firm on that bill as weights. 'Connection between lobbyist and legislator' is a 
dummy that equals 1 if a lobbyist working on a specific bill is connected to a particular legislator. This 
connection is defined either by the lobbyist having worked in that legislator's office or by the lobbyist 
having worked in a committee in which that legislator had a seat. The 'Ideology score' is DW-nominate, 
calculated by Poole and Rosenthal (2007). Higher values of this variable corresponds to a more 
conservative political line. 'Republican' is a dummy that equals 1 for legislators that are a member of the 
GOP, 0 for members of the Democratic Party, and is set to missing for independents. 'Worked in Wall 
Street' is a dummy that equals 1 if the legislator has ever worked for a finance, insurance, or real estate 
firm. All regressions include 'Bill complexity', defined as the total number of pages that describe and 
contain the full text of a bill, expressed in logs, and a dummy that is 1 if the bill is classified as tight. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
PAC contributions * Republican
PAC contributions * Worked in Wall 
Street
PAC contributions * Worked in Wall 
Street after Congress
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reincarnation     \  Category 
Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act
Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and 
Consumer Protection 
Act
 American Dream 
Downpayment Act 
FHA Multifamily 
Housing Mortgage 
Loan Limit 
Adjustment Act 
 Predatory Lending 
Consumer Protection 
Act 
 Financial Services 
Regulatory Relief Act
1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 97 85 96 99 99 61
3 97 99 91 98 98 62
4 91 97 99 99 77
5 79 92 85 93 70
6 92 100 85 94 92
7 88 98 96
8 96 98
9 99 57
10 95 58
11 95
12 94
13 94
14 85
15 95
Table 8. Hiring of Lobbyists on Reincarnations of Bills 
(in percent of total number of lobbyists working on the bill)
Notes: The table reports the percent of lobbyists who worked on successive reincarnations (i.e., worked on nth and (n-1)th reincarnations) within the same category. The 
bills are grouped into six categories based on their similarities in their titles, descriptions, and provisions. Each attempt to pass a bill in a given category is labeled as a 
'reincarnation'. The names of the bills brought forward in various attempts under the same broad concept are as follows: Commodity Futures Modernization Act – 1. H.R. 
4541; 2. S. 2697; 3. H.R. 5660; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act – 1. H.R. 975; 2. H.R. 1529; 3. H.R. 1860; 4. S. 1920; 5. S. 256; 6. H.R. 
685; 7. H.R. 2060; American Dream Downpayment Act – 1. H.R. 1776; 2. H.R. 5640; 3. H.R. 3206; 4. S. 1620; 5. H.R.1276; 6. S.811; 7. H.R. 3755;  8. H.R. 5121; 
9. S. 3535; 10. S. 2169; FHA Multifamily Housing Mortgage Loan Limit Adjustment Act – 1. H.R. 1629; 2. S. 1163; 3. H.R. 4110; 4. H.R. 176; 5. H.R. 1461; 6. H.R. 
5503; Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act – 1. H.R. 3901; 2. H.R. 4213; 3. H.R. 4250; 4. S. 2415; 5. H.R. 1051; 6. H.R. 3607; 7. H.R. 3807; 8. S. 2438; 9. 
H.R. 4818; 10. H.R. 833; 11. H.R. 1663; 12. H.R. 1865; 13. H.R. 1182; 14. H.R. 1295; 15. H.R. 2201; 16. H.R. 4471; 17. H.R. 3915; Financial Services Regulatory 
Relief Act – 1. H.R. 665; 2. S. 900; 3. H.R. 3951; 4. H.R. 1375; 5. H.R. 3505; 6. S. 2856. 
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
0.290*** 0.210*** 0.133*** 0.370*** 0.370***
[0.013] [0.014] [0.009] [0.016] [0.015]
0.021*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.026***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Voting history 0.199*** 0.222***
[0.005] [0.005]
Switch along party lines 0.059*** 0.073***
[0.002] [0.003]
Additional amendments 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000]
0.419*** 0.211***
[0.027] [0.009]
Observations 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390 32390
R-squared 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.40
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Lobbying expenditures
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator
Dummy=1 if lobbying expenditures by 
consumer organizations > 0
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or tight based on the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more details). The bills 
are further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in the same 'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and 
category names). Note that each category and reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. The dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on 
successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. Lobbying 
expenditures are the total amount spent on lobbying on a particular bill by the financial firms that list the bill in their reports ('the affected firms'), expressed in natural logs. Lobbying expenditures at the firm level 
for each specific bill is calculated by splitting the expenditure of that firm equally among all bills the firm lobbied on. 'Connection between lobbyist and legislator' is a dummy that equals 1 if a lobbyist working 
on a specific bill is connected to a particular legislator. This connection is defined either by the lobbyist having worked in that legislator's office or by the lobbyist having worked in a committee in which that 
legislator had a seat. In columns I and II, voting history is proxied by a dummy equal to 1 if the legislator expressed a stance against deregulation in the last three reincarnations of a particular bill. In columns III 
and IV, the regressions control for switch along the party lines, measured by the number of legislators in the same party as the legislator who switch. In columns V and VI, the regressions control for the 
number of new amendments to the previous reincarnation of the bill. In columns VII and VIII, lobbying expenditures by consumer organizations are defined in a similar manner and then a dummy that equals 1 
if these expenditures are positive is constructed. In columns IX and X, we add a time trend. However, due to collinearity, we drop the legislator*congress interactions, and include only the legislator fixed 
effects. All regressions (except Columns V and VI) include 'Bill complexity', defined as the total number of pages that describe and contain the full text of a bill, expressed in logs, and a dummy that is 1 if the 
bill is classified as tight. Robust standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 9. Lobbying, Connections, and Probability of Switch to Being in Favor of Deregulation: Robustness to Additional Controls
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if stance changes from against to in favor of deregulation
 
 
 
 
 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI
0.311*** 0.282*** -0.254*** 0.625*** 0.100*** 0.335***
[0.013] [0.020] [0.016] [0.026] [0.004] [0.121]
0.021*** 0.011 0.003 0.022*** 0.031***
[0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
Observations 29938 29938 19126 19126 32390 32390 32390 32390 37130 37130 733
R-squared 0.49 0.48 0.64 0.64 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.82 0.82 0.55
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Connection between lobbyist and 
legislator
Lobbying expenditures
Table 10. Robustness: Alternative Measures of Legislator's Stance
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or tight based on the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for 
more details). The bills are further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the fact that the bills that end up in the same 'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each 
other (see Table 2 for the individual bill and category names). Note that each category and reincarnation pair defines an individual bill. Recall that the dependent variable in the baseline 
regressions in Tables 5-8 is a dummy with value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately 
voted on, and if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. All other cases (i.e., when no switch happened and when the 
switch was from being in favor to being against) are encoded as 0. The dependent variable in columns I-II is the same as the baseline switch measure, but replaces the cases of 0 with 
missing if the switch was from being in favor to being against. The dependent variable in columns III-IV is the same as the baseline switch measure, but replaces the cases of 0 with missing 
if the stance on the previous attempt of the same bill was in favor of deregulation. The dependent variable in columns V-VI is the mirror image of this original switch measure, i.e., a dummy 
with value 1 if the legislator changed her vote from 'aye' ('nay') to 'nay' ('aye') on successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if the legislator switched 
from (co-)sponsoring a bill to not (co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. All other cases (i.e., when no switch happened and when the switch was from being against to being in 
favor) are encoded as 0. The dependent variable in columns VII-VIII takes on three values: -1, 0, and +1 for switch in stance from being in favor to being against deregulation, keeping the 
stance unchanged, and for switch in stance from being against to being in favor of deregulation, respectively. The dependent variable in columns IX-X is a dummy for the legislator's 
position  being in favor of deregulation (rather than the switch  in the position as in all other specifications). Finally, the dependent variable in column XI is the switch in stance from being 
against to being in favor based on only those bills which have recorded roll call data. Given the limited number of observations, regression XI can be implemented with only a restricted set 
of fixed effects and there is not enough variation to estimate the coefficient on connections. Lobbying expenditures are the total amount spent on lobbying on a particular bill by the financial 
firms that list the bill in their reports ('the affected firms'), expressed in natural logs. Lobbying expenditures at the firm level for each specific bill is calculated by splitting the expenditure of 
that firm equally among all bills the firm lobbied on. All regressions include 'Bill complexity', defined as the total number of pages that describe and contain the full text of a bill, expressed in 
logs, and a dummy that is 1 if the bill is classified as tight. Robust standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I II III
0.319*** 0.153*** 0.147***
[0.013] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 32390 32390 32390
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.46
Legislator * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes
Category * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes
Reincarnation * Congress fixed effects yes yes yes
Table 11. Robustness: Alternative Measures of Lobbying
Notes: All regressions are estimated as linear probability models. All bills are classified as lax or 
tight based on the rules they would impose on the financial institutions (see Table A2 for more 
details). The bills are further grouped into six categories based on their similarities to reflect the 
fact that the bills that end up in the same 'category' actually are 'reincarnation' of each other (see 
Table 2 for the individual bill and category names). Note that each category and reincarnation 
pair defines an individual bill. The dependent variable is a dummy with value 1 if the legislator 
changed her vote from 'nay' ('aye') to 'aye' ('nay') on successive reincarnations of a lax (tight) bill, 
if the bill was ultimately voted on, and if the legislator switched from not (co-)sponsoring a bill to 
(co-)sponsoring, if the bill did not have a roll call. Lobbying expenditures are the total amount 
spent on lobbying on a particular bill by the financial firms that list the bill in their reports ('the 
affected firms'), expressed in natural logs. Lobbying expenditures at the firm level for each 
specific bill is calculated by splitting the expenditure of that firm equally among all bills the firm 
lobbied on. In all regressions, lobbying expenditures are aggregate expenditures by all firms that 
lobby on a bill but the firm-level expenditures are calculated in three alternative ways. Lobbying 
expenditures in column I corresponds to the measure in Table 5, but also includes lobbying by 
bankers' and other industry associations. Lobbying expenditures in column II are overall lobbying 
expenditures (on all issues rather than only the specific issues of interest) by the firm. Lobbying 
expenditures in column III uses the share of reports that list that issue to split the firm-level 
lobbying expenditures among different issues. All regressions include 'Bill complexity', defined as 
the total number of pages that describe and contain the full text of a bill, expressed in logs, and a 
dummy that is 1 if the bill is classified as tight. Robust standard errors clustered at the legislator 
level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: Dummy=1 if stance changes from against to in favor of deregulation
Lobbying expenditures
